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ABSTRACT
Despite initially denying Kim IL Sung’s requests for a military reunification in
1949, Josef Stalin decided to support an invasion of South Korea in 1950. This
paper explores the origins of the Korean War and the roles of both the Soviet
Civil Administration and Kim IL Sung in convincing Stalin that the invasion
was necessary, and that it would be neither prolonged, nor involve American
interference. Throughout the initial occupation of North Korea, Stalin
preferred to maintain the status quo on the peninsula, as he was open to, but
deeply suspicious of plans for reunification and restrained Kim’s ambitions.
However, both the SCA and Kim manipulated Stalin and played off both his
fears of a southern led invasion, and potentially losing a communist ally to
China. By 1949 Stalin had already been convinced by them of the necessity for
a military reunification and cautiously approved Kim’s plans.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK)
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Korean War has seen
both a reinvigorated resonance due to the on-going release of archival documents,
as well as a fresh immediacy due to renewed tensions on the peninsula and Russia’s
attempts to restore and strengthen relations with North Korea. Of all the actors in
Korea’s political history however, the Soviet Union has received the least attention
by Western historians, who have tended to concentrate on the American, Chinese
and Korean roles on the peninsula. Moreover, while the early period of Korea’s
division has been covered extensively, comparatively few studies have focused on
Soviet policy in the region, and until recently have relied on scant Soviet sources.
This lack of primary sources caused historians to make conclusions that were
generally inferred by the rhetoric of Soviet policy, and as a result, reached
drastically varying interpretations. With the declassification of archival documents
from the former Soviet Union, beginning in the early 1990’s, historians have been
given a unique opportunity to reassess many of the events surrounding the division
of Korea and the Korean war by integrating new materials, evidence and
perspectives into a narrative that had previously been dominated by American
sources.
Archival documents now show that prior to 1949, Josef Stalin preferred to
maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula, as he was deeply suspicious of Kim
IL Sung’s plans for reunification and sought to restrain his ambitions. During 1949
however, both the Soviet Civil Administration (the occupying government of North
1

Korea established by the USSR) and Kim IL Sung began to manipulate Stalin through
reports of growing clashes at the border as well as Kim’s “policy of balancing” which
played off of Stalin’s fears of China’s increasing role in the communist movement in
Asia. With Stalin convinced that military reunification was inevitable and that the
eventual conflict would be neither prolonged, nor involve American interference,
Soviet policy began to gradually shift towards cautious expansionism in early 1949.
This narrative is a significant departure from the historiography prior to the
opening of the archives as it shows that Kim had more agency in the conflict than
previously argued. While North Korea was highly dependent on the USSR, Stalin did
not have pervasive control over him. Ultimately Stalin relied on Kim and the Soviet
Civil Administration (SCA) for information on the peninsula, and they consequently
played an extensive role in informing Soviet policy regarding a military invasion.
The origins of the Korean War therefore illustrate the balance of power held by the
Soviet Union and North Korea, and show that the conflict was a civil war with both
strong indigenous and international elements. Kim Il Sung, a politician with large
ambitions, enticed the Soviet Union to become heavily involved and help him
attempt to gain control over the Korean peninsula. Stalin meanwhile used the
peninsula as a battleground to advance his own foreign policy goals and prestige
within the communist movement.
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES
This paper will rely on recently declassified primary documents from the
period 1945 - 1950, the majority of which have come from Russian archives. The
documents have been obtained from the Cold War International History Project
2

Digital Archive, an initiative established by the Woodrow Wilson Center for
Scholars, which has also translated many of the sources into English. While the
scope of inquiry has been significantly increased for historians of Soviet-North
Korean relations, they are still hampered by the fact that many more, potentially
significant, documents have yet to be released. Furthermore, while some North
Korean sources have been made available to Western scholars, most notably the
captured documents at the National Archives in Washington DC, they are generally
limited to government decisions at the provincial levels and below, offering little
insight into Kim IL Sung’s decision making and relationship with Stalin. Therefore,
one of the main, and most obvious, methodological challenges of this paper is the
limitation of available documents. However, the material that has been made
available is incredibly revealing and has contributed to the wider use of Soviet
sources in the historiography. These documents include records of Politburo
meetings and decisions, official orders, as well as telegrams, cables and
communications between Stalin, Kim IL Sung and high-ranking officials from the
USSR and North Korea.
It should also be noted that while many of the revelations made since the
partial opening of the Russia archives are not new, they provide further evidence to
arguments already deduced from other sources. As historian Andreas Oberender
emphasizes, it is unlikely that any new sources from the archives will significantly
alter our understanding of Stalin’s approach to foreign policy or his relationships

3

with communist leaders such as Kim IL Sung. 1 Czech historian Voitech Mastny
makes a similar assertion, remarking that the “greatest surprise so far to have come
from the Russian archives is that there was no surprise”, arguing that the
perspectives from the sources seem to conform to what was publicly stated by the
Soviet government.2 However, though the archival documents may not contain any
dramatic surprises or “smoking guns”, their value goes beyond confirmations of
arguments already made by historians. These documents offer rare insight into
Soviet foreign affairs. As an example, Bulgarian historian Radoslav Yordanov points
to the theory of layered policy revealed in the Russian archives.3 This idea, first
introduced by Jack Matlock, US Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow, argues that there
was layered bookkeeping in Soviet decision-making, which included policy aimed at
public consumption, another aimed at the United States and finally the real policy,
which was reflected in Soviet actions and covert operations.4 This layered policy is
especially evident in the archival documents on Stalin’s foreign policy in North
Korea, specifically in documents aimed at alleviating concerns of communist allies
abroad. Though this presents another methodological problem for historians, since
it is not always apparent when documents reflect actual calculations or simply
propaganda meant to mask real intentions, it is beneficial in providing insight into
Stalin’s perception of the USSR’s role in Korea, how he wanted to portray it to the
1

Andreas Oberender, "Stalins Postwar Foreign Policy," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History 13, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 940
2 Voitech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 9
3
Radoslav A. Yordanov, The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War:
Between Ideology and Pragmatism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 15.
4 Peter Ruggenthaler, The Concept of Neutrality in Stalins Foreign Policy, 1945-1953
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 45.
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rest of the world, and offers clues into Soviet decision making. Therefore, while the
available documents do not contain answers to every question surrounding the
origins of the war, they illustrate a clearer picture of Soviet involvement in North
Korean nation building, the relationship between the two nations, as well as a
glimpse into the motivations behind the actions of both Stalin and Kim IL Sung.
These perspectives have been previously non-existent. Therefore, this paper will
apply these new sources to the historiographical debate to help add nuance to it.
This topic has only been given cursory attention until recently but contains valuable
parallels and insights into Russian and North Korean foreign policy today. It also
acknowledges the fact that many of these debates cannot be fully put to rest until
the further release of documents from Russian and North Korean archives.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
As many scholars have noted, much remains obscure regarding the origins
and root causes of the Korean War. Two of the most fundamental questions
pertaining to the relations of the Soviet Union and the DPRK ask what kind of role
the Soviet Union played in the planning of the invasion before June 25, 1950 and
what were Stalin’s motives? The second asks to what extent should the conflict be
classified as a civil or international war? These two questions are of course
interrelated and are at the core of the historiographical debate.
The historiography of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the origins of the
Korean War has been plagued with, until recently, a lack of primary sources from
communist countries, which has resulted in incomplete and widely varying
assessments of its role. Furthermore, it has also facilitated the excessively large role
5

ideology has played in informing these narratives.5 This role of ideology generally
divided historians into three distinct categories. The orthodox school consists of
historians who argued that the Soviet Union’s foreign policy was aggressive and
expansionist and therefore responsible for the conflicts of the Cold War. The second,
revisionist school, placed emphasis on the role of America’s aggressive foreign
policy. The third school, identified as post-revisionist, arose after the end of the Cold
War and introduced a more balanced approach to the narrative. This last school
depicted Soviet Foreign policy as pragmatic but opportunistic, while also asserting
the existence of an American empire.
Although these schools encompass a broad range of arguments within
themselves, they become a useful framework when merged with the various
theories of Stalin’s foreign policy and Soviet international behavior. Among these
theories of Soviet foreign policy, Western historians have generally been divided
into three major perspectives, and when applied to Korea, they can be defined as
“hegemonic expansionism”, “communist fortification” and “cautious expansionism”.
These theories focus on the role of ideology in Stalin’s foreign policy and along with
claims about Stalin’s motives, are at the core of the competing models. The merging
of these elements reveals a dynamic historiographical discussion.
The theory of hegemonic expansionism characterizes the Soviet Union as a
power that sought world hegemony and was therefore incompatible with the
international community, especially with the United States. Daniel Yergin, an
5

Chull-Baum Kim. The Truth about the Korean War: Testimony 40 Years Later (Seoul:
Eulyoo, 1992), 187.
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eminent historian of Soviet foreign policy, has described this view as the “Riga
Axiom”, which experts in the United States government generally operated under
during the Cold War.6 This perspective is uncompromising, illustrating the Soviet
Union as a permanent adversary to the US and informed historical narratives by
highlighting communist strengths and capabilities instead of weaknesses. A main
tenant of this model is the idea that Stalin’s primary motivation for supporting
communist revolutions abroad was to secure his role as the leader of communism
and acquire global power. Furthermore it imagined communist ideology as playing
the most important role in informing Soviet behavior. 7
This model heavily informs the Orthodox school of thought which arose
immediately during and after the events of the Korean War. It is important to note
however that due to a lack of primary sources, Orthodox historians’ explanations of
Soviet behavior vary dramatically, with many even completely ignoring the USSR in
their accounts, or otherwise relegating it to the background and instead placing
emphasis on China’s role in the conflict. However, the majority agreed that the
invasion of South Korea was part of Stalin’s grand plans. The school did little to
establish a well-defined relationship between Stalin and Kim, as Stalin was not only
seen as the architect of the war, but as the puppet master of both Kim and North
Korea. It depicts Stalin as motivated by the desire to use North Korea as a
springboard to communize the rest of Asia, and that they essentially made all the

6

Erik Van. Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalins Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Berg,
1989), 9.
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Adam B. Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," in The Conduct of Soviet Foreign
Policy, ed. Erik Peter Hoffmann (New York, NY: Routledge, 1981), 136.
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basic political decisions in North Korea.8 Therefore, it views the war as international
in origin, with the United States reacting to the dominance of the Soviet Union in the
peninsula. Although many of the orthodox school’s arguments have become either
outdated, or largely irrelevant, many have continued to inform more recent debate.
Historian Robert Slusser for example, recently argued that Stalin concealed a plan to
occupy the entire Korean peninsula for himself, purposely keeping his allies in the
dark about his intentions.9
The “Communist fortification” theory characterizes Soviet foreign policy as
more pragmatic and inherently defensive in nature. In this model, the Soviet Union’s
foreign policy was wholly motivated by security concerns and was seen to behave as
a traditional power within the international system, not one that wanted to
overthrow it. In cases where it supported communist revolutions, as in Korea, its
main, if not only concern, was the security of the USSR. Therefore, according to the
theory, its primary interest in maintaining a friendly regime in North Korea was for
it to act as a security buffer. This model therefore did not see it necessary for the
Soviet Union to become deeply involved in nation building in Korea or in planning
an invasion of South Korea.
This model informed the Revisionist school which arose around the late
1960’s, a general period of mistrust in American foreign policy, and reached its peak

Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, North Korea: Building of the Monolithic State
(Berwyn, PA: KHU Press, 2017); 17
9
Robert Slusser, “Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-1950: Stalin’s Goals in Korea,” in
Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Tokyo: University
of Tokyo Press, 1977), 123-46.
8
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in the 1980’s with Bruce Cummings’ two massive volumes on the origins of the
Korean War. Cummings’ theories expanded on earlier works, most notably I.F
Stone’s The Hidden History of the Korean War (1952), and Robert Simmons’ The
Strained Alliance (1975), which attempted to shift blame from the Soviet Union to
the United States as well as highlight the civil nature of the conflict.10 Cummings’
arguments detracted significantly from the Orthodox school and were largely an
indictment of American involvement in the Korean War. In his assessments,
Cummings highlighted Korean agency by arguing that the conflict largely arose from
local conflicts among political groups in Korea. Cummings and other Revisionists
highly exaggerated the internal factors of the war, although their arguments were
integral to the debate as they made substantial contributions to the historiography
by demonstrating a significant amount of North Korean agency in the invasion. 11
While the school contributed to a broader understanding of the bilateral
responsibilities for the conflicts in the Cold War, like the Orthodox school, it did not
have the benefit of Soviet archival materials. Without these sources many of its
conclusions relied on scant evidence and generally regarded Stalin’s actions as
reactionary to U.S policies, thus placing emphasis and blame on the United States.
The school also generally overemphasized the indigenous elements of the revolution
and failed to link them to international factors. Instead, its historians downgraded
the Soviet Union’s role to that of a pragmatic and unwilling partner or even one that

10 Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyŏngyang, Moscow and the Politics of
the Korean Civil War. (New York: Free Press, 1975), 7
11 William Stueck.. Rethinking the Korean War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2013); 28
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was minimally involved, such as David Rees who argued that all available evidence
suggested that Moscow didn’t expect an attack.12
The period of détente significantly changed the historiography after the
transcripts of tapes recorded by Nikita Khrushchev were published in a memoir in
1970. The memoir recollected several decades of Soviet history and provided a rare
inside look into personal conversations with Stalin and secret politburo meetings on
the Korean War. The revelations within it led to a major reassessment of the Soviet
Union’s role in Korea and dealt severe blows to both Orthodox and Revisionist
accounts. In the tapes, Khrushchev recounted the origins of the Korean War stating,
For many years we insisted that the initiative for starting the Korean War
came from South Korea. Some say there is no need to correct this version of
events, because it would be of advantage only to our enemies. I’m telling the
truth now for the sake of history: it was the initiative of Comrade Kim Il Sung,
and it was supported by Stalin…It was not Stalin’s initiative but he supported
Kim Il Sung. Although I blame Stalin for all the crimes he committed, on this I
am with him.13
Khrushchev’s recollection was a significant departure from revisionist accounts as
well as the official Soviet line, which emphasized that the USSR had no knowledge of
the invasion and that the ROK had instigated the conflict. Significantly though, while
Khrushchev admitted the Soviet Union’s role in the conflict, he placed primary
responsibility with Kim IL Sung and the North Koreans, and moreover claimed that
Stalin tried to limit Soviet involvement. For the orthodox school, it shifted the

David Rees. Korea, The Limited War. (Dehra Dun: Natraj Publishers, 1985), 32
Khruschev, Nikita Sergreevich. Khruschev Remembers. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. 144145
12

13
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central figure from Stalin to Kim and for revisionists it showed evidence of Soviet
participation and knowledge of the invasion.
Khrushchev’s tapes contain inherent biases and issues, and are further
hampered by the fact that Stalin, especially in his last years, was highly skeptical and
mistrusted even his close associates; therefore it is unlikely that he would have
divulged his intentions to his politburo entirely. However, the passages on North
Korea are incredibly insightful as they are the only instance where Khrushchev,
going against the entire anti-Stalinist tone of the memoir, decided to defend Stalin’s
actions. Had Khrushchev been motivated simply by protecting the image of the
Soviet Union while denouncing Stalin, he would have been far more likely to have
taken up the Orthodox account while placing responsibility with the Soviet leader.
Nevertheless, for the first time the memoirs provided Western historians with an
opportunity to incorporate a Soviet source into their narratives and highlighted the
need to incorporate archival evidence from the USSR.
The second shift occurred after the opening of the Soviet archives following
the collapse of the USSR in 1991, which provided Western historians with a wealth
of formerly classified documents on Soviet decision making in foreign affairs. This
broadened access facilitated a shift in the historiography of the Korean War by
allowing historians to come to consensuses on many debates and investigate the
nuances of the relationships between the Soviet Union and the DPRK. It also saw the
emergence of the Post-Revisionist school, which in many ways began to synthesize
the findings of both the Orthodox, and Revisionist schools. It effectively dismissed

11

many of the arguments of both schools, providing firm evidence of the far-reaching
Soviet involvement on the peninsula, while also showing the cautiousness of Stalin’s
policies and Kim’s independence from him.
This revelation of Stalin’s cautious approach promoted the theory of Cautious
Expansionism, which was first proposed by Russian historian Vladislav Zubok and
later expanded upon by Erik Van Ree. The model is essentially characterized by a
more complex duality of expansion and fortification. It understands that Stalin had
multiple considerations and motives in his foreign policy and while there is a lot of
debate, many historians agree that security issues were among the most significant.
The model asserts that Stalin was at times ready to concede to the United States and
the international community as his aspirations were generally limited, and he was
skeptical of communist revolutions and allies abroad. Furthermore, unlike the
Communist Expansionism model which argued ideology fuelled and informed
policy, the Cautious Expansionism model admitted that ideological beliefs may have
“legitimized, but did not determine, the Kremlin’s foreign policy.”14
This model is used by the Post-Revisionist school, which presents a
realpolitik approach to Soviet foreign policy and which tends treat the Korean War
in the wider context of decolonization in Asia after the Second World War. It asserts
that the Soviet Union primarily saw Korea as just another Japanese property, which
could be exploited and looted, but stresses that it did not have any grand

14

Zubok, Vladislav. "Stalins Plans and Russian Archives." Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (April
1997): 302
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operational plans. 15 The main historians within this school include Katheryn
Weathersby, Richard Thorton, Andrei Lankov and Charles Armstrong. However
their interpretations of primary documents vary greatly and there is little consensus
on important questions such as whether Kim was truly a puppet of Stalin, whether
Stalin directly micromanaged policies in Korea, or if he gave Terentii Shtykov, head
of the SCA, free reign, and what motives he had in approving the invasion of South
Korea.
The synthesis of revisionist and orthodox schools has also allowed for more
nuanced approaches to Stalin’s policies as well as his relationship to Kim which are
discussed in more depth in the following chapter. The post-revisionist school is also
characterized by its understanding that due to the nature of foreign policy it is
impossible to assign a concrete definition to Stalin’s policies as they were fluid and
changed according to different geopolitical considerations. Finally, the school has a
tendency to recognize the conflict as an internationalized civil war and therefore
distinctions between its international and civil natures have become largely
irrelevant. As Allan R. Millet succinctly states, “[modern] civil wars are seldom, if
ever, fought in an international vacuum.”16 Therefore, as the school agrees, it is
impossible to isolate international and domestic factors from one another, as civil
wars tend to have internal and international dynamics as well as a shifting set of
political actors who all have distinct agendas.17

Millet, “The Korean War” 191
Millett, Allan R. "The Korean War: A 50-Year Critical Historiography." The Journal of
Strategic Studies 24, no. 1 (March 2001): 193
17 Millet, “The Korean War,” 190
15
16
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STALIN’S POST-WAR FOREIGN POLICY AND THE JOINT TRUSTEESHIP ISSUE
(1945)
In the late 1920’s Stalin had adopted his theory of “Socialism in One Country”
into Soviet policy, focusing primarily on asserting and expanding his influence
within the USSR. By the last years of the Second World War, changes in the Soviet
Union’s position on the world stage facilitated a renewed interest for him in the
revolution abroad, though this was at first focused mainly in Europe.18 However,
due to a multitude of factors including the United States’ position in Japan and the
Chinese communist revolution, Stalin’s attention gradually turned to the Far East.
While Stalin had some expansionist goals in Korea, such as the establishment of a
warm seaport, he followed a policy of cautious and limited expansion as he was
primarily concentrated on socialism within the USSR and relegated the world
revolution to the background.19 This policy was largely influenced by a suspicion of
communist revolutions and leaders abroad, and helps explain Stalin’s occasional
cooperation with the United States such as his decisions on the issue of a joint
trusteeship in Korea.
Stalin’s decisions to occasionally cooperate with the West are one of the key
arguments made by historians who subscribe to the cautious expansionist model of
Soviet foreign policy. For example, in his analysis Eric Van Ree points to the Soviet
withdrawal in Manchuria and Northern Iran as evidence of Stalin’s modest global

18

Samuel Wells. Jr, “Stalin’s Decisions for War in Korea” (presentation, Woodrow Wilson
Conference, Washington, D.C, June 6, 2013.)
19 Samuel Wells. Jr, “Stalin’s Decisions for War in Korea” June 6, 2013.
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aspirations.20 These limited aspirations also emerge from archival documents which
show that Stalin’s efforts to expand the Soviet Union’s zone of direct military
influence were “rare and rather easily checked.”21 His tendency to acquiesce to the
demands of the United States are illustrated when, by the end of 1945 at the
Moscow Conference, Stalin agreed to a joint trusteeship on the Korean Peninsula.
During the conference, the governments of the United States and the USSR, along
with China and the UK pledged to commit to an “agreement concerning a fourpower trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.”22 Historians tend to
have difficulties in explaining Stalin’s decision to agree to the trusteeship. Orthodox
arguments contend that the Soviet Union was disingenuous in its affirmation of a
trusteeship and simply used it as a ploy to lull the United States into a false sense of
security.23 Revisionist historians such as JongSoo Lee are less pessimistic in their
approach, suggesting that the Soviet Union was fully supportive of the trusteeship
for reasons that included the fact that it “reminded them of an old turn-of-thecentury spheres of influence discussion between Imperial Japan and Czarist Russia
to divide up the peninsula themselves also at the 38th parallel.”24 Archival evidence
however points to more pragmatic policy decision-making, which fit within the
trends illustrated by the cautious expansionism model. Stalin was sincere in his
Erik Van. Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalins Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Berg,
1989) 7.
21 Ree, “Socialism in One Zone”, 8.
22 Report of the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Moscow, December 16-26,
1945. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library
23 Lee, Jongsoo. "The Division of Korea and the Rise of Two Koreas, 1945–1948." In
Routledge Handbook of Modern Korean History, edited by Michael J. Seth, (150 – 193)
Abingdon: Routledge, 2016; xvi
24 Jongsoo. “The Division of Korea and the Rise of Two Koreas”, 173
20
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acceptance of a joint trusteeship, but also hesitant to fully commit to it, as he
believed he could potentially gain more on the peninsula. This is evident in Stalin’s
meeting with the former Premier of the Republic of China T.V. Soong on July 2, 1945,
when Stalin made it clear that while he agreed in principle with the trusteeship, he
did not agree unilaterally with the decision and had reservations regarding its
potential for success.25 As Van Ree argues, Stalin was not enthusiastic about the
trusteeship as he suspected the Soviet Union’s role could potentially obtain more
than one quarter of the peninsula, but “they did not reject it out of hand because
they were not prepared to accept an American role in the peninsula.”26 Essentially,
the agreement was a maneuver to potentially avoid an aggressive US response had
the USSR rejected the trusteeship outright. The Soviet Union took on a wait-and-see
approach by providing reluctant affirmation and while it was likely not looking to
dominate the entire peninsula, it was also hesitant to accept a minority role.
REVOLUTION AND NATION BUILDING: THE SOVIET CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN
NORTH KOREA (1945 – 1946)
Near the final stages of the Asia-Pacific War, local Korean groups had begun
preparations for a post-war transition and independence. By mid August 1945,
numerous Korean self-government groups or “peoples committees” made up of local
activists and political figures emerged throughout the peninsula to fill the vacuum
left by the retreating Japanese forces. While the American forces dismantled these

“Record of a Meeting between T.V. Soong and Stalin,” July 02, 1945, History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, Victor Hoo Collection, box 6, folder 9, Hoover Institution
Archives. Contributed by David Wolff.
26
Erik Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone: Stalins Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Berg,
1989) 51.
25
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committees, the Soviet Union decided to use them to their advantage by
incorporating them into the Soviet Civil Administration (SCA).27 Established in
October 1945, the SCA acted as the occupying government of North Korea and was
ostensibly created to oversee the establishment of an independent Korean
government. Unfortunately, its real purpose, as well as its structure and the balance
of power it held in the initial occupation does not clearly emerge within the existing
historiography. Orthodox historians illustrated the SCA as a military government
arguing that through it, the Soviet Union had taken immediate control and
established a puppet state similar to those throughout Eastern Europe. Accounts
such as Korean historian Dae-Sook Suh’s for example claim that the Soviet Union
virtually dictated its wishes to the North Koreans through its military government
immediately after occupation.28 Interestingly however, many other traditional
accounts from the period avoided the term “military government” including a US
Department of State study in 1950 which claimed, “the Soviet military occupation
was not permitted to waste its energies in the morass of military government, using
instead selective and covert forms of control while focusing their effort on the
creation of a strong indigenous regime.”29 These contradictory accounts and
debates on the fundamental character of the SCA were further complicated by
revisionist accounts, which downplayed its role on the peninsula. Historians such as
Cummings and Armstrong for example both argue that the Soviet Union was never
27

Andrej N. Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960.
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 12
28 Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University
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able to dominate the local Korean power organs through the SCA.30 Some
revisionists also emphasize the cooperation between the Koreans and the USSR,
such as Michael Seth who argues that by working with the people’s committees the
SCA was able to carry out a relatively smooth and peaceful transfer of power.31
While archival documents now clearly show that the SCA played a prominent
role in effectively controlling North Korea from 1945 until the establishment of the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea in 1948, fundamental questions regarding the
power balance and its relationship with North Korea still remain. Many postrevisionists have made strong arguments that point to the fact that the Soviet Union
failed to establish hegemonic control in the early stages of occupation due mostly to
political unpreparedness and the fact that Stalin’s ambitions were limited in the
region. Moreover, archival documents show that Stalin’s focus was quickly
concentrated away from the South as the Soviet Union attempted to tighten its grip
over the North. While the current consensus among historians has been that the
Soviet Union failed to establish immediate hegemonic control, it is unclear to what
extent Soviet policy pursued it in the first place. Kathryn Weathersby for instance
argues that the Soviet Union sought pervasive control on the peninsula and its
policies were carefully calculated and meant to protect its economic and strategic
interests through a “traditional Tsarist approach of maintaining a balance of power
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in Korea.”32 Weathersby’s assessment regarding the USSR’s motives compliments
orthodox accounts as she builds off of earlier assumptions that Soviet policy was
firmly rooted in old tsarist interests and approaches.33 Historians such as Lankov
however disagree that there was a clear approach by the Soviet Union or that its
policies were grounded in tsarist interests. While Lankov reasserts the Soviet
Union’s economic and defense interests in Korea, he emphasizes that the Soviet
Union did not have a real plan on the peninsula and instead, at least until 1947,
relied on loose control and supervision by its military. According to Lankov, “Soviet
policy in Korea was to a very large extent a result of improvisation and ad hoc
decisions.”34 Charles Armstrong echoes this claim in assessing that “events in North
Korea often ran ahead of Moscow’s plans.”35 A memorandum dated January 11,
1946 to Terentii Shtykov, the head of the Soviet Civil Administration and de-facto
leader of North Korea, strongly supports this theory. The memorandum outlines the
first several months of Soviet occupation and concludes that the Red Army had little
to no control over the territory and was “unfamiliar with army political work and
completely inexperienced in questions of political work among a civilian population,
particularly a foreign population.”36 According to the document, not only were the
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Soviets ineffective at maintaining power in urban areas, they had no contact with
rural district administrations which represented the largest percentage of the
population, as they did not “interest themselves in the life and situation of the
Korean countryside.”37 This unpreparedness was due to the fact that in the first year
of occupation, the Soviet Union saw North Korea simply as a conquered territory to
loot and had not yet established a firm policy regarding the peninsula. The fact that
the SCA had failed to tap into the rural district administrations also shows a severe
miscalculation of the country’s political situation, and provides further evidence of
the USSR’s assumption that the Koreans were not ready for self-rule. These
miscalculations and unpreparedness precluded successful cooperation between the
USSR and North Koreans in the occupied peninsula.
COMMUNIZING THE NORTH: THE SCA AND KOREAN COMMUNIST GROUPS (1945
TO 1946)
Archival documents from the early period of occupation also illustrate the
USSR’s initial misreading of the communist presence on the peninsula and a clear
shift in focus away from communist groups in the South. From 1945 to 1946, the
SCA focused its policies on maintaining control in the North and completely ignored
developments in the South. This sharp policy shift is apparent in three documents
from 1945 to 1946, which offer a glimpse into the drastically shifting Soviet
interests in the early stages of occupation. The documents also highlight the
multiple layers within Soviet policy and archival material, offering insight into the
Program Digital Archive, Archives of the Russian General Staff, op. 480, 29, st. 5, p. 2, pa. 21,
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contrasting assessments of events in Korea made within diplomatic circles in the
Soviet Union and among Soviet officials in the SCA.
In a report conducted by the SCA, which sketched the existing communist
movement in the North and South in 1945, the authors concluded that while they
were the most influential party throughout the peninsula, they “turned out to have
neither the proper leaders nor a clear and specific platform.”38 The report also
highlighted the need for Soviet policy to concern itself with communist groups in the
South which, while powerful, were competing with a larger Democratic party that
represented “big landowners and capitalists” and “openly engaged in proimperialist and anti-Communist propaganda.”39 An assessment of Korea written by
Soviet diplomat Yakov Malik in 1945 also concluded that while the communists in
the North had increased their influence, there was a “noticeable tendency” of the
American authorities in limiting the political activity of communists in the South.40
An obvious difference in the documents however was that while the SCA report
pointed out numerous insufficiencies among the northern communist organizations,
Malik’s report was far more optimistic and makes no mentions of these points. This
is a result of the intended audiences of the documents, as the SCA report was top
secret, while Malik’s report was meant for dissemination among larger diplomatic
38 "Soviet Report on Communists in Korea, 1945," 1945, History and Public Policy Program
Digital Archive, AGShVS RF. F. 172. OP 614631. D. 23 pp. 21-26. Translated by Gary
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21

circles in the Soviet Union. Therefore, while both documents reveal Soviet policy
focusing heavily on the southern communist movement, the SCA report reveals the
realities of the Soviets Union’s control in the North.
In contrast to the 1945 documents, a 1946 SCA report assessing the political
and economic situation, painted a far more pessimistic assessment of the
communist movement in the North, and entirely excluded the South. In the report,
Lieutenant Colonel Fedorov and Major Livshits outline the serious weaknesses of
the northern communist movement, including the fact that there were “no
communists in the villages” and that the organizations had failed to attract workers
or peasants. The report concludes by prescribing a purge within the party, adding
that, “in the present situation the Korean Communist Party … is problematical at the
very least…there is still no order in their own house. Organizationally it is still a very
loose and motley mass choked with alien elements.”41 Noticeably absent is any
mention of the southern communist movement and other documents from 1946 to
1948 do not make any more mentions of Soviet policy thinking or deliberation on
this issue. As historian Armstrong argues, Stalin ordered restraint within North
Korea, as he was extremely cautious of provoking the United States by supporting
revolution in the South.42 Armstrong also places emphasis on the fact that Stalin
ignored the South due to the fact that supporting the southern communists wouldn’t
contribute to maintaining Soviet control over the North, which was the USSR’s

“Untitled Memorandum on the Political and Morale Situation of Soviet Troops in North
Korea and the Economic Situation in Korea,” January 11, 1946.
42 Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 127
41

22

primary focus. 43 However, it is evident from the 1945 and 1946 reports that this
decision also arose from the fact that the Soviet Union had miscalculated the
feasibility of a strong communist government in the North. Therefore, the USSR’s
neglect of southern communists and cooperation with the United States can also be
explained as a consequence of its focus on the issues within its own zone of
occupation. By 1946 the Soviet Union had begun to consolidate its interests in the
peninsula and, acknowledging its failures, focused on tightening its grip on North
Korea.
PROVISIONAL PARTY AND SOVIET PEOPLES DEMOCRACY (1946 – 1948)
Unfortunately, of the available Soviet politburo documents from 1946 – 1948,
only a small fraction make any mention of Korea. One of the inferences that can be
made from this is that the SCA was given a high level of autonomy, and was allowed
to decide on and implement policies with little oversight.44 Since military documents
are almost completely inaccessible however, the result has been a significant gap of
information for scholars of Soviet-North Korean relations in this period, especially
in 1948 when the Soviet government officially withdrew from Korea. The
documents that are available however are significant in that they help shed light on
Stalin’s relationship with North Korea vis-à-vis the SCA and suggest that Stalin gave
an unusual amount of independence to the SCA, deferring to Shtykov on matters of
Korean affairs. While the USSR had begun to tighten its grip over the North in 1946
Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 127; Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean
War. (Seoul.: Yuksabipyungsa, 2002), 88
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and closely controlled the growth of the communist party, by 1947 it had become
less directly and less aggressively involved in Korea.
Due to the USSR’s belief that the Korean people were not ready for self-rule
and its awareness of the limitations of the local communists, they did not officially
recognize any local group that claimed to represent the people as the legitimate
government.45 Instead, they decided to import communist leaders who were neither
independent nor too far removed from Soviet control. Established under direct
supervision in December 1945, the Provisional People's Committee for North Korea
was lead by Kim Il Sung, a Korean guerrilla fighter and a Major in the Soviet Red
Army, who was handpicked by Marshal of the Soviet Union Lavrentiy Beria and
supported by Terentii Shtykov, head of the SCA.46 By February 1946, the SCA
officially handed over its authority to Kim and the Provisional People’s Committee
for North Korea, which brought its de facto control to an end. While the exact
structure of power sharing after this transfer is not made clear from the archives,
the SCA continued to maintain a strong level of influence in Korea, and as Lankov
argues, “at the very least it gave Moscow full information on what was going on in
North Korea.47 The Soviet Union further maintained control within the newly
formed provisional government. Although the government consisted of a number of
different factions of communist groups, including former guerrilla fighters, domestic
communist groups and those loyal to China, the strongest camp was the Soviet
faction, with Kim IL Sung at its helm.
Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, 24
Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, 26
47 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, 47
45
46

24

While the general consensus among recent historians has been that Stalin
showed restraint on the peninsula, there have been varying inferences made on the
Soviet Union’s commitment and contribution to developing a communist revolution
in Korea. Historians such as Armstrong for example, emphasize that the Soviet
Union did not play the most important role in the development of the communist
party in North Korea. He highlights that communism had already become an
important part of the political discourse of anti-colonial resistance in Korea, adding
that “the DPRK was more than a revolution from abroad, imposed by the fiat of the
Soviet occupation, but was shaped by local circumstances and recent historical
legacies.”48 Cummings also makes similar assertions and supports the idea that the
communist party arose in spite of any Soviet involvement. Both historians make
strong cases for Korean agency in the emergence of the communist party however
they err by bolstering their arguments with the idea that the Soviets allowed a
democratic party in Korea to form with multiple parties including nationalist and
religious groups.49 This argument that the Soviet Union facilitated the establishment
of a democratic government, and therefore that communism arose naturally, is
fundamentally flawed and ignores the USSR’s direct involvement in shaping the
movement in North Korea. More recently, historians have pointed to a model,
initially proposed by British historian Hugh Seton-Watson, in which communists
groups, supported by the Soviet Union, would attempt to gain power in three stages:
a real coalition with other parties, a bogus coalition in which communists would
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subvert power, and a final stage in which they would establish hegemonic control.50
Lankov applies this model to Korea, arguing that it closely resembled the early
stages of socialist development in North Korea, when Stalin and his ideologists
devised the theoretical concept of a “People’s Democracy.”51 In this concept, the
Soviet Union would first pursue policies of cooperation and moderation by
establishing broad democratic revolutions, which would include numerous political
groups. However, this initial stage was not seen as a permanent state in the political
evolution but rather a “transitional type of system, the principle function of which is
the construction of socialism.”52 In the Korean context, this cooperation could be
seen in the Provisional government, which consisted of 141,000 members in the
Democratic Party and only 43,000 in the Communist Party.53 While on the surface
this had made it seem that the provisional government had fair representation, the
USSR appointed communist leaders to the other parties to ensure their
compliance.54 Therefore, while the Soviet Union encouraged cooperation and
tolerated non-communist parties within the United Democratic National Front,
under the guise of political pluralism, in reality they had little to no independence
and were quickly weakened and eliminated by the communists.
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Another argument brought forward, and one especially prominent in
revisionist accounts, is that Stalin ordered restraint by North Koreans against
landlords and didn’t support major socialist reforms. These historians point to a
document written by Stalin in 1945, which asserted that Koreans would have
political independence and argue that the early reforms made by the provisional
government were nationalist in origin and involved little to no Soviet involvement.55
These perspectives tend to highlight Soviet cooperation and Korean agency in North
Korean political life. For example, historian Chong-Sik Lee points to the 1946 North
Korean Land Reform Laws which emphasized that the property of Japanese
occupiers and collaborators was to be nationalized, therefore making the reforms a
nationalist, rather than a socialist, program.56 This argument attempts to distance
the political developments in 1946 from direct Soviet interference, however it
ignores the fact that in practice the majority of large and medium sized industries
were forced to collaborate with the Japanese, and therefore the reforms were
socialist in practice.57 Furthermore, recent documents have shown the constant
involvement of the SCA in the Provisional Government, including their drafting of
Kim IL Sung’s speech to the congress of the Workers Party of North Korea in 1946,
which outlined the land reform laws. 58
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While the Soviet government clearly played a prominent role in establishing
a friendly regime, by 1947 primary documents show a waning interest, as well as
the increased role that the SCA played. A recently declassified 1947 ciphered
telegram from Shtykov to Stalin is indicative of the Soviet Civil Administration’s role
in Soviet- North Korean relations, as well as Stalin’s and the Politburo’s loosening of
their direct involvement in the region. In the telegram, Shtykov directly addressed
the Politburo, asserting the need for 86 Soviet engineers and specialists to build
railroads after having spent 6 months pleading with the Soviet government to no
avail. 59What is immediately striking about the telegram is its direct and instructive
language. In the post war period Stalin recast the Politburo to fit with his personal
habits, and all decisions necessitated his approval, with the Politburo retaining very
little, if any freedom of initiative. 60 This created a culture of deference within the
politburo, and Stalin’s inferiors avoided giving him direct instructions. As evidenced
in numerous archival documents, subordinates would only suggest policies to Stalin,
always deferring to him on the final word. The language in Shtykov’s telegram
however is unique in its directness and instructs Stalin that he “needs” to employ
the policies being suggested.61 This suggests several key points in the relationships
between the Soviet government, the SCA and North Korea. Firstly, it indicates that
Stalin deferred to Shtykov and the SCA on Korean affairs. Secondly, it suggests that
the Soviet government was not strongly committed to political matters in Korea, as
59
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Shtykov complained that on several occasions the Soviet government outright
refused his requests and then ignored him for over 6 months. Finally, in his warning
to Stalin, Shtykov highlighted the fact that if “Soviet specialists are not in North
Korea before the reunification of North and South Korea … it will be inevitable that
the Korean temporary government, … will invite American specialists”, further
adding that this would lead to a strengthening of American influence in Korea and a
detriment to Soviet interests in the region.62 This warning is revealing not only
because it indicates Stalin’s fears of increased American influence on the peninsula,
but also that from the perspective of the SCA, an eventual reunification was
inevitable. It is also an example of a tactic used by both the SCA and Kim Il Sung in
pushing Stalin to become more heavily involved in the region, discussed more in
depth below. Shtykov’s warning indicates that by 1947 the SCA had begun to see
reunification as not only a possibility, but inevitable in the near future.
The period from late 1947 through 1948 is the least accessible in the archival
material due to the fact that the daily management of North Korean affairs was
conducted by the SCA by this point. The actions of the SCA are largely unavailable to
historians since almost all communication was internal and Shtykov rarely
discussed policy with Stalin.63 As a memo to the Secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union explained, “The Foreign Relations Department has not, to the
present time, been receiving regular and detailed information about the situation in
Korea because the [SCA] located in Pyongyang, send all the information to their
62
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respective Departments.”64 The immediate inference to be drawn is that by this
point, Stalin heavily relied on Shtykov to oversee the new North Korean provisional
government and diffused an unprecedented amount of power to the SCA. There are
however two major exceptions where Stalin was directly involved in the
management of North Korea. In February 1948, Stalin and the Politburo drafted the
Provisional Government Constitution, and later in April, met again, to discuss the
establishment of an independent North Korean State and reject the results of the
South Korean elections.65 However, these two actions were focused on solidifying a
separate government in the North, thereby preventing a peaceful reunification.
On September 18, 1948, the Soviet Union announced to North Korea that it
would officially withdraw all troops from North Korea by the end of the year. The
final withdrawal was completed on December 15, 1948 with approximately 200
military advisors remaining in the North. 66 Although the withdrawal was made
ostensibly to remove foreign influence from Korea, the Soviet Union was fully aware
that the creation of two separate governments precluded a reunification of the
peninsula.67 At this point, Soviet policy was still ill defined, and focused on
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maintaining influence over the North rather than developing any serious plans
towards reunification.
STALIN’S POLICY “SHIFT” AND THE “CHANGED INTERNATIONAL SITUATION”
(1949-1950)
After the withdrawal in late 1948, a critical point of contention for Soviet
foreign policy in Korea was the disparity between the Soviet Union’s restrained
attitude and the highly nationalistic Korean communists who were determined to
extend their authority over the entire peninsula.68 Despite constant pleas for an
invasion from Kim IL Sung, Stalin rejected his ambitions, and maintained a cautious
policy. However, on May 14, 1950 Stalin seemingly made a dramatic shift when, in a
telegram to Mao, he confirmed his agreement with North Korea on the proposal to
invade South Korea. The telegram was brief and did not outline Stalin’s rationale,
but rather gave a vague assertion that due to the “changed international situation”
the Soviet Union agreed with the proposal of Kim IL Sung to “move toward
reunification.”69 What Stalin meant by the altered international situation continues
to remain at the center of debate among Korean War historians. A variety of theories
have been proposed which debate the factors that influenced Stalin’s decision and
whether he acted pre-emptively out of a sense of inferiority and fear of a southern
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led invasion, or whether he was bolstered by the increased offensive capabilities of
the Soviet Union and North Korea. Archival materials show that Stalin’s initial
decision to pursue an invasion were motivated by fears of a southern led invasion
and the increasing strength of the South, however he only chose to officially confirm
an invasion once he was sure that a quick victory could be ensured with Chinese
assistance, and limited or no American involvement.
Furthermore, although archival materials have not shed much light on
Stalin’s specific considerations, they have illuminated the path that Soviet foreign
policy took from the early months of 1949 until the invasion’s approval in May 1950.
While the decision to invade has been labelled by a number of historians as a
dramatic shift or a “U-Turn” in foreign policy, it is clear from records that the
decision was a logical step that was carefully planned and arose from a cautious but
opportunistic policy.70 Some historians, such as Anatoly Torkunov, have gone
further and argued that up until 1950, Stalin still seriously considered pursuing a
peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula.71 In reality, Stalin had already begun
to accept the idea of assisting Kim in a military campaign early in 1949. However
Stalin’s decision centered heavily on assessments of the potential of American
intervention and the strength of the North Korean military vis-à-vis South Korea.
Stalin wanted to avoid a protracted conflict with minimal foreign interference,
therefore his denials of Kim’s multiple requests for invasion throughout 1949 were
never outright, but rather always conditional and issued on the basis of
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unfavourable timing. To this end, Stalin relied heavily on Kim IL Sung and the SCA
for information on political and military matters on the Korean Peninsula, which
Kim took full advantage of to push a narrative of conflicts at the border, instigated
by the South. By fuelling the idea that a conflict was inevitable, Kim worked to
further convince Stalin of the necessity for a pre-emptive invasion, while at the same
time alleviating Stalin’s largest concern of a potential American response. Stalin was
not as convinced of the urgency as Kim, as illustrated by his somewhat restrained
attitude and decision not to invade in 1949. However Kim’s influence played a large
role in Soviet decision-making in Korea, specifically in Stalin’s assessment of
American intervention.
Traditional narratives regarding Stalin’s decision for invasion in 1950 have
generally centered on the increased offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union, which
arose primarily from the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war and
the USSR’s first successful test of the atomic bomb at the end of 1949. Anatoly
Torkunov argues for example that Stalin felt emboldened after the acquisition of the
atomic bomb and felt he had been given a free hand in Korea since he believed that
the Soviet Union’s atomic capabilities would deter US Intervention in the Far East.72
Other historians, including the authors of “Uncertain Partners”, have even suggested
that the turn towards Asia was insincere and these capabilities gave Stalin the
impetus to divert military attention away from Europe.73 This argument has
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recently been revived after the release of a letter in which Stalin retroactively
assessed the initial decisions for an invasion with a communist ally. However, as will
be discussed in detail below, the document is not a credible resource as it sharply
deviates from the other available material. Furthermore, the investment made by
Stalin is also supported by the sheer economic contributions that the Soviet Union
made to North Korea from 1945 to 1949, the numerous cultural and political
agreements, as well as the newly revealed extent of military support provided
during the initial invasion.74
Not only do these narratives rely on biasedly culled material, they also fail to
account for the Soviet foreign policy failures at the time that contributed to Stalin’s
shifting attention towards Asia as well as Stalin’s insecurities of an inevitable
southern led invasion. As Soviet foreign policy expert Samuel Jr. Wells notes, prior to
1949, the Soviet Union’s primary foreign policy goals were to prevent the
establishment of a western defensive alliance in Europe, which included the United
States, and to block the creation of a separate West German government.75 By early
1949, these policy goals were defeated after the establishment of NATO and the
Federal Republic of Germany, which influenced Stalin to focus more economic and
military resources in Asia. Another aspect that many of these narratives either miss
entirely or downplay was the insecurity among the Soviet leadership of a southern
led invasion. As Torkunov notes, “up to the end of 1949 … [Stalin] experienced a
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growing fear that the opposing side would violate peace and attack North Korea.”76
Among his allies Stalin acted seemingly unconcerned of the ROK, even joking in a
meeting with Kim in March 1949 that he had nothing to fear of the “puny southern
army.”77 However, in his internal communication amongst the politburo, he
frequently worried about the strength of the ROK, even reprimanding Shtykov for
failing to report clashes at the border.78
How heavily Stalin weighed each individual factor though, cannot be
ascertained as Stalin kept no personal diary, nor were there any documents
indicating policy debates among the politburo.79 However, the explanations for
Stalin’s decisions need not be mutually exclusive, as the archival material shows that
they were all seriously considered in the decision to invade. What is also made clear
by the archival material is that Stalin’s decision was neither a dramatic shift, as
some historians have depicted, nor was it a reluctantly sanctioned attack. By 1949,
Stalin had already abandoned his policy to preserve the status quo, and actively
monitored the Korean situation to find an opportunity to support and plan a rapid
invasion of the South.
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Although Stalin was opportunistic and desired an eventual absorption of
South Korea, he maintained peaceful reunification as a possible, though increasingly
unlikely, option. While Stalin did not officially change his on-going policy of nonaggression, as early as March/April 1949 there was a clear shift away from restraint
during which time the Soviet Union extensively built up North Korea militarily and
economically.80 This shift was heavily influenced by both the SCA and Kim IL Sung
exploited the conflicts at the border in order to instill a fear in Stalin of a southern
led invasion, and eliminating a peaceful reunification as a likely scenario. This fear
was propagated throughout early 1949 by numerous reports of increased clashes
along the border between the armies of the North and South, as well as the
increased buildup of southern forces. Stalin took these reports seriously, exhibited
by his response to one on April 20th of significant numbers of violations from South
Koreans over the 38th parallel, in which he advised that the North Koreans should
begin preparations for more provocative actions from the South.81 Shtykov
continued to send numerous cables to Stalin maintaining that an invasion of North
Korea would result in a swift and decisive victory at very little cost to the South.82
On May 2, 1949, Shtykov heavily pushed an alarmist narrative of an impending
attack by the South reporting that in connection with military intrusions of the
North, the ROK was dramatically growing in size and was being concentrated along
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the 38th parallel, highlighting that “the South Korean authorities are paying special
attention to the Pyongyang direction.”83 He also highlighted the extent of aid
provided by America, as well as a purge of unreliable soldiers in the Republic of
Korea Army (ROK) being replaced with “reactionary youth”.84 Further fueling
Stalin’s fears, he added that an operation by the South had already been planned and
passed on to commanders and “supposedly planned for the month of June.”85 He
even fueled fears of a southern conspiracy suggesting that “[a]gents of the South
have set up terrorist and subversive groups in every province in the North, which
are ordered to recruit new members, conduct espionage, and draft plans for
uprisings.”86 He finally concluded that North Korea “did not have enough trained
personnel, adequate weapons… to rebuke intensifying excursions from the South.”87
Though Shtykov’s reports were not entirely fabricated, Katheryn Weathersby argues
they heavily exaggerated the actual situation at the border and undoubtedly
influenced Stalin to abandon his belief in a peaceful reunification.88 Throughout the
rest of 1949, Stalin came to see military reunification as not only likely, but
inevitable.
To this end one of the important factors under consideration by Stalin was
the support of China, as he did not want to shoulder the responsibility for a
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prolonged conflict, which could damage Soviet reputation. As Richard Peters and
Xiaobing Li argue, this support was a prerequisite for any invasion plans, as Stalin
would have nothing to lose since “the onus of the attack would fall on Mao and Kim,
regardless of its success or US reaction."89 On May 18, 1949 this support was
tentatively given through a telegram from Kovalev, leader of a group of Soviet
specialists in Northeast China, to the Soviet Council of Ministers. In it, Mao relayed a
message to the Soviet Union, confirming a drastic increase in aid to North Korea and
promising that if a war between the North and South broke out, China would do
everything within its power to support North Korea.90 Mao also advised Kovalev
that Kim should wait until an opportune moment to strike, detailing “an attack by
North Korea on the South might be mounted at the beginning of 1950 if the situation
at the beginning of 1950 favors this.”91 For Stalin, this expression of support and
affirmation that an attack could be mounted at an appropriate time, helped to
solidify his resolve of the invasion’s inevitability.
By September 1949, the SCA reports, Kim’s pleas and China’s affirmation of
support influenced Stalin to again seriously consider assisting North Korea in a
military campaign. In a September 11 telegram from Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko to the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang, the Soviet Union attempted to
ascertain the military and political ramifications of a northern led invasion. The
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letter relayed a message from Stalin urging an immediate meeting with Kim in order
to probe him regarding the strength of the ROK and the Northern Army, the
conditions of the partisan movement in the South and what kind of measures the
Americans could potentially take in response to a northern invasion.92 This was the
first serious attempt by the Soviet Union to consider the proposal of invasion.
However, by September 14, after discussing these questions with the North Koreans,
the SCA had advised Stalin that it was politically disadvantageous to attack as the
North would be seen as aggressors, and moreover that a quick victory would not be
possible due to military insufficiencies. 93 The SCA furthermore highlighted a fear
that a prolonged conflict would give “the possibility to the Americans to render
corresponding aid to Rhee… the Americans probably will intervene in Korean affairs
more decisively than they did in China and … apply all their strength to save Rhee.”94
A document from September 24, 1949 reaffirmed and further elucidated the
Politburo’s decision against invasion citing the North Korean military’s inferiority,
the lack of a partisan movement in South Korea, and the potential of American
interference.95 However, although Stalin again rejected plans for an invasion, it is
important that it was a Soviet incentive to pursue these questions in the first place,
and not a direct response to Kim’s pleas for assistance. Furthermore, these
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rejections were neither outright, nor did they explicitly reject the idea of an
invasion, but were rather based on disadvantageous timing. At this point, the Soviet
Union decisively abandoned its policy of peaceful reunification and instead began to
search for an opportune moment to begin the invasion.
While both the SCA reports and Kim IL Sung’s pleas both agreed on the need
to invest in the North Korean military, the SCA also stressed that there was a high
chance of a prolonged conflict with American involvement. The 1949 SCA
documents not only reveal that the largest consideration for the Soviet Union
regarding the invasion was American involvement, but also the specific fears among
the leadership. According to it, a drawn out war could be “used by the Americans for
purposes of agitation against the Soviet Union and for further inflaming war
hysteria” and “could turn the [Korean] population against the party that started the
conflict. 96 The fear of a prolonged conflict was important to Stalin because not only
would it mean losing influence in Korea, but also the damaging effects it would have
on Soviet reputation in Asia.
DEAN ACHESON PRESS CLUB SPEECH (1950)
In Stalin’s consideration of American involvement, perhaps one of the largest
events with potential to sway foreign policy in Korea was a speech presented on
January 12, 1950, by U.S Secretary of Defense, Dean Acheson, to the National Press
Club. In his speech, Acheson outlined the United States foreign policy in Asia as well
as the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, importantly leaving the Korean peninsula
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outside of the protected zone. While the panicked reaction in the ROK to the speech
has been well documented, the question of its impact on Stalin and Soviet foreign
policy remains unresolved.97 Since one of Stalin’s primary concerns in approving
Kim’s lobbying for invasion was the possibility of American intervention, the effects
of the Acheson speech on Soviet policy has been given a central role in the narrative.
However, with the archival materials available, it is evident that the speech had a
negligible impact on decision making in the invasion of South Korea.
Historians such as Kim Hakjoon have given this speech a prominent role,
advancing the opinion that this exclusion provided Stalin with a green light to
invade since it was likely seen in Moscow as evidence that the United States would
not intervene in any conflict. 98 Hakjoon goes further, arguing that when Stalin
referred to the changed international situation he “probably had in mind the speech
given … by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson three months earlier in January,
1950."99 Katheryn Weathersby similarly concludes that the timing of Stalin’s
approval was “at least in part” a response to the new defensive perimeter.100 Other
historians however have questioned the importance of the Acheson Speech such as
James Matray and the authors of Uncertain Partners who argue that Acheson’s
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speech had little if any impact on Soviet deliberations.101 As Robert Tucker, a Soviet
political history expert points out, even though Indochina was excluded from the
perimeter as well, it was clear to the Soviet Union that U.S aid and growing
involvement was underway, therefore U.S responses to a Korean crisis could not be
anticipated based simply on Acheson’s declaration.102 Historians have also pointed
to the fact that Acheson’s speech was more nuanced than it is sometimes given
credit for. As historian John Merrill explains, the speech “acknowledged the
importance of Asian nationalism, warned of a Soviet attempt to pry loose Manchuria
from China, and stressed accurately that the US would defend Korea under the
collective security arrangements of the United Nations.”103 While the Acheson
speech did outline a security perimeter, the remainder of the speech actually sought
to build support for U.S. Policy in Korea while also serving as a warning to the Soviet
Union against provocative actions.104 According to Acheson in his memoirs, the
speech was intended to “carry some sense of the problem in the Far East, the
limitation of our power and direction of our purpose.”105 It is unlikely that the Soviet
leadership focused only on the security perimeter and entirely missed these
nuances. Furthermore, the assertion that the speech was primary in influencing
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policy assumes an inexperienced Stalin taking Acheson’s public statement of private
policy at face value.
While only one Soviet document makes mention of the speech, and there is
no direct reference in it to Korea, it is illuminating in its revelation of Soviet
attitudes and reading of Acheson’s declaration. On January 17th, 1950, Mao visited
Moscow to discuss the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, and
subsequently met with Soviet leaders Molotov and Vyshinsky. During their
discussions, Molotov raised to Mao the impression that Acheson’s speech was
“designed to deceive directly public opinion.” Then, after having read the text in its
entirety, Mao responded that the Americans were making progress as previously
“these fabrications were the job of all kinds of scoundrels, represented by American
journalists and correspondents … [and] the U.S Secretary of State was now doing the
dirty work.”106 Mao then asked if the speech was potentially “a kind of smokescreen,
using which, the American imperialists will attempt to occupy the island of
Formosa” to which Molotov agreed, adding that the United States intended to use it
to carry out “plans of occupation” and “create misunderstandings in the relations
between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China."107 Throughout their
discussions, the communist leaders continued to frequently reference the deceitful
nature of the speech and developed a clear consensus that it should not be taken at
face value. Therefore, it is unlikely that in their assessments of the situation on the
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Korean Peninsula and the intentions of the United States, the Soviet leadership
would have heavily relied on the speech.
Stalin was more receptive to the idea of a military reunification of the Korean
Peninsula following the Acheson speech, however there is no evidence that it was a
direct result of this. In fact, many months after the speech, Stalin remained cautious
and in his March 1950 meeting with Kim, he stressed that the matter of invasion still
required “thorough preparation” and must be “organized in such a way that there
will not be a large risk.”108 Though Stalin accepted the idea of an invasion in theory,
he remained adamant about avoiding a protracted conflict, and relied on
information from both the SCA and Kim IL Sung in his calculations.
THE GOTTWALD LETTER (1950)
In 2005, a letter from Stalin to Klement Gottwald, leader of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, emerged from the Soviet archives, adding a new layer to the
debate regarding Stalin’s calculations of the potential United States involvement in
the Korean conflict. The letter, dated August 27, 1950 was written a few months
after the Soviet Union boycotted the United Nations Security Council in response to
the defeat of their proposal to expel the Nationalist Chinese representative.109 The
absence of the Soviet Union allowed the Council to vote in favor of invoking military
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action and sending UN forces into Korea.110 Historians have endlessly debated the
Soviet Union’s absence in the meeting, especially given the fact that it had veto
power and could have easily blocked the resolution.111 In his letter, Stalin outlined
the reasons for the Soviet withdrawal, explaining,
Following our withdrawal from the Security Council, America became
entangled in a military intervention in Korea and is now squandering its
military prestige and moral authority. Few honest people can now doubt that
America is now acting as an aggressor and tyrant in Korea and that it is not as
militarily powerful as it claims to be. In addition, it is clear that the United
States of America is presently distracted from Europe in the Far East. Does it
not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It undoubtedly
does.112

The document indicated that Stalin not only predicted US involvement but also
actually intended to lure the United States into a prolonged engagement in order to
divert their resources from Europe. If true, this would confirm that the main priority
in Soviet international strategy was Europe, rather than Asia and that Stalin was
insincere in his alliance with Kim IL Sung and Mao. The letter would also explain
Stalin’s decision to veto the UN Resolution, rationalizing that by giving the American
government a free hand to establish a majority vote in the Security Council, they
would allow it to become embroiled in Korea. Historians such as Donggill Kim have
110

Weathersby, Kathryn. “ The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New
Documentary Evidence” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter
1993), 428
111
Weathersby. “ The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War”, 429
112 "Letter from Filipov (Stalin) to Soviet Ambassador in Prague, conveying message to CSSR
leader Klement Gottwald," August 27, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), fond 558, opis 11, delo
62, listy 71-72, reprinted in Andrei Ledovskii, "Stalin, Mao Tsedunh I Koreiskaia Voina
1950-1953 godov," Novaia I Noveishaia Istoriia no. 5 (September-October 2005), 79-113.
45

taken this document at face value to advance the argument that Stalin was
unconcerned with US involvement and firmly place the majority of the
responsibility for the conflict on Stalin, while removing agency from Kim IL Sung
almost entirely.113
The overreliance of one archival document in asserting a claim illustrates the
danger in cherry picking documents rather than analyzing the entire set, while also
revealing the broader difficulty in interpreting Soviet sources during Stalin’s reign.
When reading these documents, it is crucial to carefully consider the Machiavellian
character of Stalin and the image he wished to portray of Soviet leadership to his
allies and the international community. Historians like William Stueck dismiss
assertions such as Donggil Kim’s, pointing out that the document should be seen
“less as an accurate rendering of past calculations or of Stalin's current state of mind
than as an effort to reassure a nervous ally of the ineffable wisdom of Soviet
leadership.” Stueck touches on the important point that depending on whom he was
communicating with, Stalin manipulated and twisted the image of his leadership,
therefore helping to explain the sometimes-contradictory nature of the primary
documents. The Gottwald letter’s credibility is placed into further question, as it is
not corroborated by any other documents from the period. While the letter presents
Stalin as having a shrewd Korean master plan, the remainder of the materials clearly
shows a cautious Soviet policy that feared and carefully calculated the potential
involvement of the United States. Considering the fact that Stalin held off for over a
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year on Kim’s requests, specifically urging the need to contain the scale of the
conflict it is clear that he was waiting for an opportune moment to invade and avoid
a protracted conflict. Kim had tirelessly worked to convince Stalin that the conflict
would be over quickly. Finally, the sheer amount of economic and military support
provided to North Korea illustrates a clear commitment to the region by Stalin. The
most recent archival documents have proven the full extent of the military
assistance provided by the Soviet Union showing the direct participation of Soviet
pilots in the conflict.114 Assurances by Kim IL Sung that the conflict would be over
quickly with no foreign involvement were factors that Stalin took under serious
consideration, and therefore the Gottwald letter was simply retroactive justification
for a conflict that became unintendedly prolonged.
BETWEEN TWO GIANTS: KIM’S POLICY OF BALANCING (1950)
After Soviet troops withdrew in 1948, Kim had begun to consolidate power
and gain independence within the North Korean political system, however he found
it harder to gain independence from Stalin and Mao. As Lankov argues, “despite the
noisy assertion of North Korean propaganda, the dependence of …North Korea … on
the Soviet Union and China was never really overcome.”115 To maintain control over
his foreign policy, Kim was instead forced to influence Stalin through a tactic known
as a “policy of balancing” between Moscow and Beijing. Contrary to the orthodox
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image of a coherent and monolithic communist partnership, post-revisionist
scholars tend to recognize the early alliance between Stalin and Mao as problematic
and uneasy.116 During the Chinese civil war, Stalin was hesitant to provide the PLA
with support and played both sides by maintaining a relationship with nationalist
leader Chiang Kai-shek, while Mao ignored Stalin’s advice on making agreements
with the Nationalist Kuomintang.117 As Korean historian Hyung-Kook Kim points out
“Mao had come to power in China not because of Stalin but, in many ways, in spite of
Stalin.”118 In fact, after the PLA victory, Stalin had failed to congratulate Mao and did
not immediately recognize the PRC.119 Though the Treaty of Friendship in 1950
signaled a rapprochement in their relationship, Stalin still found it difficult to
embrace Mao and the treaty was primarily a pragmatic measure to address security
concerns in Asia.120 By exploiting these major rifts between the USSR and China, Kim
was able to gain aid and support for the invasion of South Korea from Stalin under
his own terms while at the same time, reducing the influence of the USSR and China
in the region. Both Stalin and Mao were aware that if one of the allies faltered, Kim
could simply turn to the other.121
While Kim’s policy of balancing is briefly acknowledged in some of the
literature on North Korean foreign relations, it has not received adequate attention
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in the historiography of the Korean War. This is partly due to the fact that Kim’s
policy only became prominent and refined during the Sino-Soviet Split in the late
50’s and 60’s, and was only first acknowledged in reports from communist
embassies in North Korea in the late 1970’s.122 However, archival evidence shows
that the policy had its origins much earlier, in the lead up to the Korean War.
Between 1945 and 1948 North Korea relied heavily on support from the Soviet
Union and was highly dependent on it both economically and politically. While it had
closer cultural and historic ties to China, the Chinese People's Liberation Army
(PLA) were embroiled in a civil war and the Communist Party of China was not in a
position to provide significant support to North Korea. Bruce Cummings proposes
that the PLA’s victory in September 1949 and the establishment of the Peoples
Republic of China had an enormous refractory effect on Kim IL Sung’s foreign
policy.123 Not only had it provided the North Korean regime with an additional
source of aid, it had provided it with a powerful ally that could offset the Soviet
Union’s influence in the country.
Specifically, Kim exploited the growing competition between China and the
USSR in his interactions with Stalin to obtain aid for an invasion of South Korea.
Though documents regarding meetings between Kim and Mao have yet to be
released, it is clear from Soviet sources that at least in 1950, Kim was leaning
towards the Soviet Union. A ciphered telegram from Soviet representative Aleksei
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Ignatieff in Pyongyang sent to Vyshinsky for example indicates that Mao wasn’t even
aware Kim was meeting with Stalin.124 This document suggests that Kim had
purposely kept China in the dark, partly in order to play up to Stalin, but also later to
entice Mao to play a larger role on the peninsula.
Another document of significance is a telegram from Shtykov to the Soviet
Foreign Minister regarding a drunken luncheon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the DPRK on January 17, 1950. During the luncheon, Shtykov reported that Kim
“repeatedly underscored the great interest of the Soviet people in Korea and the
numerous wishes for quick unification of the country” but expressed
disappointment that Stalin did not deem it necessary to attack the South. Kim had
also made sure to stress the point that if the Soviet Union was unwilling to help,
“Mao Zedong is his friend and will always help Korea.”125 Shtykov correctly
interpreted Kim’s behavior as probing the Soviet Union’s outlook stating, “[i]t was
obvious that he began this conversation not accidentally, but had thought it out
earlier, with the goal of laying out his frame of mind and elucidating our attitude to
these questions.”126 The main purpose of the luncheon for Kim was to pressure
Stalin to unilaterally accept his plans for reunification while also highlighting the
fact that if Stalin faltered, Mao would satisfy his requests.
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In another telegram, dated May 12, 1950 Shtykov recalls the details of a
meeting he had with Kim IL Sung to Vyshinski. In this meeting, Kim IL Sung detailed
to Shtykov a meeting that would take place the following day between himself and
Mao, and outlined the questions they would discuss which included informing China
on the military invasion as well as requests for aid. Again, Kim probed Shtykov on
the disposition of Soviet feelings towards this meeting asking “what kind of
questions he should raise before Mao Zedong from the point of view of assistance in
the intended operation.” After declining to answer, Kim then outlined that he
intended to ask for ammunition and other aid from China. However after discussing
further with Shtykov, Kim decided not to pursue any requests for Mao about
assistance “since all his requests were satisfied by Moscow and the necessary and
sufficient assistance was given to him there.”127 Again Kim had made it apparent to
Stalin that while he was thankful for Soviet support, he would need to continue to
satisfy his requests or otherwise risk losing an ally to China. Kim had clearly
understood that he could bolster his military and economic requests by playing off
of Stalin and Mao’s competition for the mantle of leader of international
communism.
In total, Kim sent over 48 telegrams to Stalin requesting approval for an
invasion. Although Stalin did not approve these plans, he nevertheless provided Kim
IL Sung with his economic and military requests, supporting the buildup and
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training of the North Korean Army.128 Although Stalin undoubtedly saw an
opportunity to extend communist power in the Korean peninsula, it is clear that he
was also willing to maintain the status quo. Kim however exploited the fact that
Stalin relied on him for information on the peninsula, as well as Stalin’s wish to keep
Mao in a supplicant’s position. Kim furthermore echoed the SCA’s reports which
fueled Stalin’s growing fears of a southern led invasion. In April 1950, following the
secret meeting between Kim and Stalin in Moscow, Kim was sent to China to secure
Mao’s approval for the planned invasion which began on June 25, 1950. The
conflict’s final approval and planning were made by the Soviet Union, and although
the conflict could not have been achieved without Stalin’s assent, Kim Il Sung and
the SCA played a fundamental role in convincing him of its necessity. The conflict
was therefore neither “Kim IL Sung’s war” as some have argued, not was it a grand
master plan created by Stalin.129
CONCLUSION AND PARALLELS
With the constant stream of new archival evidence, the post-revisionist
school has firmly shown the extent of the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Korean
War; however, it often gives Stalin and the USSR too much responsibility for the
conflict. This paper has endeavored to add nuance to the understudied and often
times misunderstood relationship between Josef Stalin and Kim IL Sung, and
illuminate the decisions that led to an invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950. The
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fact that Kim had understood and exploited the rift between the USSR and China
shows that he was not simply a pawn in the Cold War, nor was the Korean War an
international proxy war. While archival records clearly demonstrate that the Soviet
Union pursued its own interests and significantly contributed to nation building in
North Korea and the Korean War, Stalin never had any grand plans in the peninsula.
He was cautious in his approach, and his primary ambition was to secure a
communist controlled North while avoiding a prolonged military conflict.
Near the end of his life, Stalin became increasingly aware of the Soviet
Union’s failures in Europe and began to heavily invest in Asian communist
movements. However, after the communist victory in China, Stalin began an uneasy
and competitive relationship with Mao for the mantle of the communist world
movement. This competition was utilized by Kim IL Sung to obtain significant
military and economic aid in North Korea. Stalin was content with supporting Kim
and nation building in North Korea, as long as peaceful coexistence remained on the
peninsula. Stalin feared that any provocative actions against the south might result
in a prolonged conflict with American intervention, which would damage the Soviet
reputation abroad, and consequently jeopardize his role as the leader of the
communist movement. While Stalin refused Kim’s requests for invasion throughout
1948 and 1949 however, he agreed with them in principle and his rejections were
conditional based on disadvantageous timing. Contrary to many arguments
therefore, his eventual approval was neither reluctant nor surprising. By 1949,
Stalin had begun to accept the inevitability of an attack due to both Kim and
Shtykov’s assessments of the situation on the peninsula. He remained cautious
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however and decided to strike after receiving explicit Chinese support, along with a
multitude of other factors such as the Soviet’s acquisition of the nuclear bomb. Stalin
was ultimately the key decision maker in the invasion, however he neither had a
grand plan, nor was Kim IL Sung simply his puppet. In fact, for the majority of North
Korea’s buildup, Soviet policy was ill informed and largely ad-hoc.
After the culmination of the Korean War, USSR-DPRK relations quickly
weakened and by the collapse of the Soviet Union, they crumbled as Russian leaders
prioritized strengthening ties with South Korea and significantly cut aid to North
Korea. However, as Putin begins to reassert Russian influence and foreign policy
interests around the world, he has also brought about a tentative political and
economic rapprochement with the DPRK. As Russia reasserts its influence in the
region, while China and the United States are mired in regional negotiations,
Armstrong notes that the current conflict in Korea is not a new crisis but rather one
that has taken on a new form.130 It is prudent therefore to recall the lessons from the
origins of the Korea War and avoid assuming North Korea is merely a puppet regime
that is easily manipulated. In negotiations for reunification and peace, it is
important to recognize that North Korea is still an independent actor that continues
to exploit loopholes in the international framework. As numerous scholars note, the
mercurial power balancing originated by Kim Il Sung is still a prominent feature in
North Korean policy today, as Kim Jong Un balances the interests of the United
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States and China, and to a lesser extent Russia, as they compete for influence over
the peninsula.131
Though Russia is seeking both its own economic and political interests in the
region, which includes boosting development in the Russian Far East, it is also
interested in security along its borders and regional stability. It therefore has
potential to become a faithful mediator between the North and South. Elena
Ponomareva and Georgij Rudov note that the DPRK might be perceptive to Russia’s
mediation as it is “interested in exiting the ‘Chinese umbrella’” and looking to Russia
as an additional base of support and as a mediator between Washington, Beijing and
Seoul. 132 Russia’s role therefore should not be underestimated, especially at the
present time when recent developments on the peninsula have borne historic
summits between the North and South, aimed at finally establishing peace and
ending a conflict that has been ongoing since 1945.
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